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Bargaining structure and bargaining scope 
in New Zealand: the climate of employer 
opinion 
Ian McAndrew* 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 removed legal restrictions on the subject matter of 
bargaining. This article reports the results of a survey of employer opinion on current 
union involvement in plant decision making and on future bargaining scope. Little 
current union involvement is reported in either operational decisions or more basic 
management strategy decisions. Some limited employer support is found for the notion 
that bargaining scope should expand with decentralization of the bargaining structure. 
The picture of industrial relations in New Zealand that emerges from a review of the 
Green Paper debate leading to the passage of the Labour Relations Act 1987 is of a highly 
regulated, highly centralized, fairly confrontational, and essentially one-dimensional labour 
relations system, with the operative dimension being wages. This is a model designed for 
equity, or more properly, equality of wage treatment, rather than productive efficiency, and 
it has clearly operated at a level somewhat remote from the average employer and 
employee. 
The Labour Government and important business lobbies found the system 
incompatible with the perceived need for greater productive efficiency, in the face of the 
increased global competition to which New Zealand industry was being exposed. The 
result was the Labour Relations Act 1987, designed, with various degrees of explicitness, 
to decentralize, defuse, and expand the scope of the New Zealand labour relations system 
(Minister of Labour, 1986b). Subsequent calls from all quarters for further legislative, 
behavioural, and attitudinal change have continued to stress the themes of decentralization, 
defusion of confrontation, and sophistication of scope in the labour relations system. 
Government spokespeople have stuck fairly consistently to the themes of breaking 
established relativities in favour of settlements appropriate to particular industries and 
enterprises, decentralizing the bargaining structure, substituting cooperation for 
confrontation, and expanding the scope of labour relations (Minister of Labour, 1988a, 
1988b, 1988c). The National Party's policy stresses the same themes, perhaps somewhat 
more vigorously. A change of government might be expected to accelerate the pace of 
labour relations change, but would be unlikely to reverse the directions. 
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The research programme defined 
The twin focuses of the research reported in this paper are two aspects of private sector 
collective bargaining in New Zealand: its structure, or the level at which it occurs; and its 
scope, or the range of subjects negotiated. Specifically, the study sought out the attitudes 
toward bargaining structure and scope, and toward union and employee involvement in 
bargaining, of those member firms of the Otago-Southland Employers Association 
employing between ten and one hundred staff. The cutoff at one hundred staff reflects the 
conventional wisdom that the future of New Zealand industry and employment will remain 
firmly rooted in small and medium sized firms. The minimum staff level of ten reflects 
the writer's experience that enterprise bargaining in very small firms is usually not viable. 
The intent, in short, was to select a sample of employers to whom enterprise bargaining 
would apply if it were widely practiced in New Zealand. 
The scope of bargaining in New Zealand 
The legislative history of the range of bargaining issues in New Zealand can be 
summarized briefly. The Industrial Relations Act of 1973 carried over the 1954 Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Consolidated Act's scope of matters negotiable within the 
formal system. Industrial matters were defined as " ... all matters affecting or relating to 
work to be done by workers, or the privileges, rights and duties of employers or workers 
in any industry ... ". This seemingly broad language was, however, reduced by a limited 
number of judicial interpretations to a relatively narrow scope of application (Minister of 
Labour, 1985a, p.l8; Geare, 1983, p.l93-195). 
The restrictions associated with this definition were removed as one of the deregulatory 
elements of the 1987legislation. The Government predicted that: 
Unions and employers will be able to come to their own conclusions about the 
proper subjects of their negotiations, and may end up bargaining on subjects as 
diverse as the introduction of new technology, superannuation schemes, the 
provision of childcare facilities, and so on (Minister of Labour, 1986b, p.ll). 
Production cost pressures, employee security, and scope 
The seminal work on union intrusions into managerial decision-making remains Neil 
Chamberlain's 1948 study of American enterprise bargaining and job control unionism. 
Chamberlain found the "primary rationale" of union leaders "penetrating" management 
decision making to be the view "that any managerial decisions or authority threatening the 
security of workers must be regulated" (Chamberlain, 1967, p.89). 
He reported that, in the union view, security related to decisions affecting not merely 
wages, but also "the selection of employees for layoff, rehiring, and promotion 
... assignment of employees to jobs ... their transfer. . .the disciplining of employees ... the 
scale and schedule of production, the introduction of labour-saving devices .. . <and> the 
closing or relocation of plants" (Ibid., pp.93-94) . The unions, Chamberlain noted, 
adopted a two-pronged approach. At the same time that they sought to control these 
elements of the job, American unions recognized the importance of general economic 
conditions and employment levels for the security of workers, and sought to influence 
macro-economic policies as well (Ibid., pp.95-96). 
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The issue of concession bargaining 
Milton Derber and his colleagues, in a longitudinal study of bargaining scope in the 
United States in the 1950's, found that bargaining scope expanded as a result of economic 
pressure for production cost reduction: 
In each of the six cases where scope of union participation had increased, the 
establishment had been confronted by economic pressures (more severe 
competition or a decline in business), and management had made an effort to 
increase plant efficiency. In each of these cases, union participation had 
increased in at least one of the following items - contracting work out, number of 
employees on a job or machine, level of work performance, scheduling of 
operations, job evaluation, or job content. In practically every case, the 
management would have preferred not to have the union involved in the item, but 
felt obliged to acquiesce in such involvement (Derber, Chalmers & Edelman, 
1961, p.95). 
In the late 1970s and the 1980s, concession bargaining was generated in the United 
States by increased product market competition for unionized firms from both foreign 
producers and non-union domestic firms. Robert McKersie and his colleagues have well 
described the strategic choices available to these firms (Kochan, McKersie & Cappelli, 
1984; Cappelli & McKersie, 1987). Among them was the seeking of production cost 
cuts and productivity improvements through union concessions. 
While private sector union density continues to decline in the United States, unionized 
plants largely remain unionized (Strauss, 1984). Clearly, however, major employers have 
seized the initiative in the labour relationship in unionized plants, increasingly 
implementing corporate human resources management policies and shop floor worker 
involvement policies designed to increase operational flexibility and enhance the 
commitment of individual workers. The demanding of concessions at the bargaining table 
has complemented these strategies implemented at other organizational levels (Kochan & 
Piore, 1985). Management has gained wage concessions, in such forms as simplification 
of pay structures, pay freezes, delayed and contingent pay arrangements, and even pay cuts, 
together with work rule changes, dealing broadly with the assignment of work and 
personnel and with production standards. 
Unions have responded to management concession proposals with renewed interest and 
some gains in benefit programs, profit sharing and other alternative compensation forms, 
employment and income security guarantees, and a broadened union role in both 
operational decisions and strategic management decisions on such matters as plant 
closings and relocations, technological changes, and the contracting out of work 
(Kassalow, 1983; Mills, 1983; Cappelli, 1984; Kochan & Piore, 1985; Cappelli & 
McKersie, 1987). While the future role of unions in unionized plants remains subject to 
speculation, it seems probable that it will be permanently broader in scope than has 
historically been the case (Cappelli & McKersie, 1985). 
In short, as Chamberlain would have predicted, recent economic pressures to cut 
production costs have heightened union interest in employee security, and further 
broadened the already broad United States bargaining agenda. Interestingly, there is some 
evidence that union gains in concession bargaining, in addition to union concessions, may 
have helped rather than hurt unionized employers in the United States, perhaps by 
promoting that elusive sense of "common purpose" (Becker, 1988). 
Implications for New Zealand 
The economic pressures of international competition are being keenly felt by New 
Zealand industry. These pressures have motivated the widespread call for cost reductions 
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and permanent productivity improvements. An embryonic concession bargaining 
approach surfaced in the 1988 award negotiations, with proposals for pay simplification 
and work rule flexibility put on the table by both public and private sector employers in 
the context of no-cost or low-cost settlements. As Grills has recently noted, the continued 
dismantling of the welfare state will provide unions with additional incentive to add 
superannuation, health care, and other benefit programmes to the bargaining agenda 
(Grills, 1988, p.161). And finally, a seemingly permanent element of unemployment, as 
a relatively new feature of the New Zealand economy, has potentially sweeping 
implications for the bargaining agenda. 
When there is no longer a job available for everyone, workers become more conscious 
of their rights to what is available. As the already apparent employer resistance to the 
wage-based redundancy payment approach stiffens, unions may well seek to establish 
workers relative rights to work, to retraining, to relocation, and to rehire, as well as 
intensifying efforts to broaden the union's role in strategic management decisions that bear 
on employee security. 
Certainly there is ample reason to believe that Chamberlain's "primary rationale" must 
be at the forefront of New Zealand union thinking; the only real question has been whether 
the unions would turn to the bargaining table under the new freedom of legally unrestricted 
scope to complement their traditional approaches. 
The union response in New Zealand 
The published positions of the New Zealand Federation of Labour (FOL) at the time of 
the Green Paper review of labour relations in 1986 certainly put forth the view that unions 
had been constrained by legal restrictions, and would seek to broaden the bargaining agenda 
with the lifting of legal constraints on scope. The FOL submission called for the 
unfettered right to negotiate those matters at that time excluded from scope as "managerial 
prerogatives", declaring that "the concept of some pre-eminent 'right to manage' is 
inconsistent with modem industrial principles" (FOL, 1986, p.21). 
Redundancy, new technology, staffing levels, workload, and methods of work were 
cited as areas where the unions sought to negotiate tHe initial decisions, rather than being 
limited to impact negotiations after the fact. Additionally: 
On a wider range of issues, there needs to be provision for workers to have a real 
input into broader business decisions from which the various issues noted above 
arise. The broader issues are those of investment policy, rationalisation, 
restructuring and mergers/takeovers (p.21). 
More recent pronouncements from the successor New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 
(NZCTU) have reiterated these views and expanded upon them. NZCTU leaders have 
recognized that the changed economic environment requires new structures and new 
approaches by unions, and that the removal of legal restrictions on scope opens up new 
opportunities: 
What has become very clear to unions is that this is not a time for defensive 
reactions ... (U)nions are now in the process of moving to restructure along 
industry lines, reform our bargaining strategy so that it is consistent with an 
industry approach, and enlarging our vision to embrace a wider range of issues 
than has traditionally been the case (Douglas, 1989, p.3 ). 
In terms of scope, the NZCTU argues for the implementation of industrial democracy 
at national, industry, enterprise, and workplace levels (Douglas, 1989; NZCTU, 1989). 
Its leadership is looking to be engaged by the government in on-going negotiations over a 
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wide range of economic and social policy issues. Current discussions over a proposed 
compact appear to be directed towards establishing the mechanisms for such a broad union 
role, and one that would ideally extend beyond the life of the Labour Government 
(Foulkes, 1988). 
In addition to the restructuring of awards to an industry basis, the unions also seek to 
be involved in a cooperative fashion at the industry level "to negotiate the adjustment 
path" for industries undergoing change (Foulkes, 1988). At the enterprise and workplace 
levels, the NZCTU envisions negotiations by workers and an expanded network of union 
delegates over a range of issues, including "organization of work ... training and skills 
formation ... new technology ... health and safety ... equal opportunities ... business plans and 
feasibility studies" (NZCTU, 1989, p.16), as unions move from a restricted, defensive role 
to a more positive, embracing one under the freedom of legally unrestricted scope. 
Concomitantly, in pursuing its vision of industrial democracy before the Government's 
Committee of Inquiry into Industrial Democracy, the NZCTU has called on employers to 
abandon "Taylorist work organization" and rigid concepts of "management prerogatives", 
and to develop production strategies and work organization methods consistent with 
worker and union input (Douglas, 1989; NZCTU, 1989). Interestingly, this is not a view 
of industrial democracy at enterprise level inconsistent with that of the Minister of 
Labour, who noted recently that, "The extension of collective bargaining to cover issues 
normally considered management prerogatives is a recognised approach to industrial 
democracy" (Minister of Labour, 1989, p.19). 
In short, New Zealand unions are moving aggressively to broaden the bargaining 
agenda at national, industry, enterprise, and workplace levels under precisely the economic 
circumstances Chamberlain would have predicted, and presumably motivated by the same 
"primary rationale" he identified among American unions. 
Management prerogatives and scope 
What might be the expected response of New Zealand employers to union initiatives to 
broaden the scope of their bargaining relationship? Most studies would suggest resistance. 
Chamberlain found that American employers resisted union penetration of management 
decision making for a variety of stated reasons: "Management fears that union 
penetration ... destroy(s) unified final authorily; the union ... constitutes a second center of 
authority, which speaks in terms of welfare rather than efficiency ... ; management objects 
to union penetration because of a lack of union responsibility ... because it believes that 
union leadership is inadequate; ... management suspects the motives behind union 
penetration ... management fears the end result of union penetration ... " (Chamberlain, 
1967, p.131-137). 
Beyond these reasons reported to him by American managers, Chamberlain suspected 
more personal motives were also at work: 
The unions' program carries a threat to the personal goals of the managers - their 
security, recognition, and self-expression .. .It challenges their essentially 
realistic philosophy. These unstated reasons lend further support to an intent to 
hold the line (p.l39). 
Subsequent studies have supported Chamberlain's findings of general reluctance, while 
at the same time reinforcing the notion that employers will accept a broadening of scope 
in exchange for union concessions where to do so makes economic good sense (Derber, 
Chalmers & Edelman, 1961; Kassalow, 1983; Mills, 1983; Cappelli, 1984). 
While New Zealand employers have operated under such restrictions as blanket 
coverage awards and some legislatively mandated substantive and procedural provisions, 
they have not been restrained at the operational level by the type of comprehensive job 
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control collective bargaining contracts that have been common in the United States. 
Thus, a largely unchallenged history of exercising managerial prerogatives far broader 
than those enjoyed by their American counterparts would lead us to expect a strong hold 
the line philosophy regarding scope on the part of New Zealand employers. 
The employer organisation response 
In its submission on the Green Paper, the New Zealand Employers Federation (NZEF) 
took the position that while a narrow definition of industrial matters was appropriate as 
the basis for scope under a system of national awards, a broader, even unlimited scope 
might be appropriate for a decentralized, essentially enterprise-based bargaining system 
(NZEF, 1986, p.31). The New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR) took an even less 
hesitant view, though its submission, too, was largely couched in enterprise bargaining 
terms (NZBR, 1986, p.67). 
In short, employer organizations linked scope to the second dimension of bargaining 
under study here: the structure of bargaining, or the level at which it occurs. This view 
would allow a broad scope for bargaining, perhaps consistent with the position adopted by 
the NZFOL/CTU, as bargaining restructures to the enterprise level, or close to it. 
New Zealand employers on bargaining structure 
Enterprise bargaining is, in fact, an oversimplification of the NZEF's position which 
advocates decentralization, but allows for a number of possible structures, including 
workplace, company, regional, and national industrial agreements. The key, from this 
perspective, is a single bargaining agent representing all employees in the workplace or, 
upon agreement of the parties, several or many workplaces within an area or industry. 
While the NZEF accommodates its broader constituency with a position somewhat 
softer than strict enterprise bargaining, the NZBR is decidedly less sympathetic in 
claiming that some employers are not quite up with the play: 
There are some in employer circles as well as those on the union side who would 
prefer to cling to blanket coverage arrangements and avoid the need to develop 
positive relationships with their employees. The new Act does not put enough 
pressure on these conservative elements. They are holding the progressive ones 
back (Myers, 1987, p.14). 
The Green Paper review provided some indication of the pattern of employer views on 
bargaining structure: 
Slightly over half of the submissions that looked at wage-fixing stated 
specifically that they supported the retention of the national award system as it 
is. While almost half of these were from unions, their position was supported by 
a significant number of individuals and organizations, as well as a small number 
of employers. These employers were, without exception, small employers, or 
organizations representing small employers ... 
A number of submissions considered that the national award system should not 
remain the central feature of wage-fixing. Of these submissions, the majority of 
those supporting fundamental structural changes to the system were employers ... 
(NZ Minister of Labour, 1986, p.28-29) 
This would suggest that many small employers are not yet convinced of the wisdom of 
decentralizing the bargaining structure, but that they may yet be won over (Wood, 1988, 
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p.169). The balance of this article seeks to begin documenting their current views on 
both bargaining structure and bargaining scope, and any links between the two. 
Design of the study 
The research data were collected by mail survey during winter, 1988. Questionnaires 
were mailed to all member firms of the Otago-Southland Employers Association 
employing between 10 and 100 staff. Two hundred and twenty-two valid, timely 
responses were received from an initial mailing to 4 76 employers, for a response rate of 
46 percent. The data are presented as a single sample. Analysis by size of workforce and 
number of unions in the plant revealed no significant differences in responses by either 
variable. No analysis by type of industry or dominant union has been attempted, though 
these suggest themselves as possible directions for follow-up research. 
Beyond classification data, information was requested on two areas: first, breadth and 
depth of union penetration and degree of workforce input in decision making under current 
practice; and second, employer views on future scope at national award and enterprise 
agreement bargaining levels. 
Unions, employees, and managerial decisions 
Employers were asked to indicate how decisions in each of 12 decision areas "would be 
handled in your plant": 
National award: This matter is specifically covered by written national award(s). 
Local agreement: This matter is specifically covered by written local award(s) or 
agreement(s ). 
Established practice: This matter is handled in accordance with established practice or 
custom at the plant. 
Negotiation-union: This matter is resolved by formal negotiations with the union(s) 
when the matter arises. 
Discussion-union: This matter is resolved by informal discussions with the union(s) 
when the matter arises. 
Discussion-workforce: This matter is resolved by discussion with the workforce or 
its representative, but without union involvement, when the matter arises. 
Discussion-employee: This matter is resolved by informal discussion with just the 
employee(s) affected when the matter arises. 
Management decision: This matter is determined solely by management. 
It was recognized that "the categories may not cover every situation", and that the 
option chosen "may be different depending on the union involved". In such cases, 
employers were asked to choose "only the one option that most accurately or most often 
would be correct". 
The twelve decision areas used throughout the study were modelled loosely on the 
Derber et al. research cited earlier, but modified to ensure a spread across behavioral rules, 
operational decisions, and basic managerial strategy decisions. They were as follows: 
(1) A decision to change work starting or finishing times. [Work schedule]. 
(2) A decision to introduce or modify rules defining what constitutes acceptable conduct 
at the workplace. [Rules of conduct]. 
(3) A decision regarding whether a particular job or machine is safe. (Job/mach 
safety]. 
(4) A decision regarding which employee to promote to a non-supervisory position. 
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[Non-supv promotn]. 
(5) A decision regarding which employees will work required or available overtime. 
[Overtime assignmt]. 
(6) A decision regarding the number of employees to work on a new job or machine. 
[#Emplee/new job]. 
(7) A decision regarding which tasks to assign to which employees. [Task 
assignmt]. 
(8) A decision regarding which employees are to be made redundant in the event 
redundancies become necessary. [Redundnt emplyees]. 
(9) A decision to contract out to another firm work previously done by employees. 
[Contract out work]. 
(10) A decision to introduce new technology or machinery. [New mach/technol]. 
(11) A decision to close or relocate the plant. [Plant reloc/clos]. 
(12) A decision that redundancies have become necessary. [Redundcy necessry]. 
The reported extent of union and workforce input on these decisions is presented in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Emplo~ers' report on current decision making_e.ractices (n=2222 
National Local Estab Negot Discuss Discuss Discuss Manag 
award agrmt pract union union wrkfrce emplyee dec is 
Work 
schedule 1.4% 1.4% 0.9% 3.6% 4.5% 49.1% 14.0% 25.2% 
Rules of 
conduct 1.4% 1.8% 2.3% 3.2% 5.4% 39.6% 5.9% 40.5% 
Job/mach 
safety 1.4% 0.5% 7.6% 1.9% 5.2% 52.4% 18.6% 12.4% 
Non-supv 
promotn 0.9% 0.5% 1.8% 0.0% 0.5% 3.2% 17.7% 75.5% 
Overtime 
assignmt 0.0% 1.4% 7.7% 0.0% 0.5% 26.2% 24.0% 40.3% 
#Emplyee 
/new job 0.0% 0.5% 3.3% 2.8% 2.4% 21.3% 9.5% 60.2% 
Task 
assignmt 0.9% 0.0% 5.5% 0.5% 0.5% 15.0% 13.2% 64.5% 
Redundant 
emplyees 0.9% 1.4% 0.5% 11.2% 11.2% 12.1% 4.7% 57.9% 
Contract 
out work 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.9% 8.2% 14.9% 4.6% 70.3% 
New mach 
/technol 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 1.8% 5.0% 19.2% 5.5% 67.6% 
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Table 1 (cont.): Employers' report on current decision making practices (n=222) 
Plant re 
loc/clos 
Redun<ky 
necessry 
National Local Estab Negot Discuss Discuss Discuss Manag 
award agnnt pract union union wrkfrce emplyee decis 
0.0% 0% 1.0% 6.9% 3.4% 12.7% 1.5% 73.5% 
1.4% 1.4% 0.5% 2.8% 4.2% 6.9% 1.4% 81.5% 
The eight input options can be collapsed into three broader categories for a consolidated 
view of the breadth of union penetration. Thus, in Table 2, Union Involvement 
incorporates the National Award, Local Agreement, Established Practice, Negotiation-
Union, and Discussion-Union options. Employee Consultation incorporates 
Discussion-Workforce and Discussion-Employee, while Management Decision stands 
alone. 
Table 2: Employer's report on current union and employee involvement in decision 
making (n=222 2 
Union Employee Management 
involvement consultation decision 
Work 
schedule 11.7% 63.1% 25.2% 
Rules of 
conduct 14.0% 45.5% 40.5% 
Job/mach 
safety 16.7% 71.0% 12.4% 
Non-supv 
promotn 3.6% 20.9% 75.5% 
Overtime 
assignmt 9.5% 50.2% 40.3% 
#Emplyee 
/new job 9.0% 30.8% 60.2% 
Task 
assignmt 7.3% 28.2% 64.5% 
Redundnt 
emplyees 25.2% 16.8% 57.9% 
Contract 
out work 10.3% 19.5% 70.3% 
New mach 
/technol 7.8% 24.7% 67.6% 
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Table 2 (cont.): Employer's report on current union and employee involvement in 
decision making (n-222) 
Plant re 
loc/clos 
Redundcy 
necessry 
Union 
involvement 
12.3% 
10.2% 
Future scope: employer opinions 
Employee 
consultation 
14.2% 
8.3% 
Management 
decision 
73.5% 
81.5% 
Employers were asked, first, to indicate those of the twelve decision areas for which 
they "would approve generally applicable rules being negotiated into national or mu!ti-
district awards". Secondly, employers were asked to indicate those of the twelve decisiOn 
areas "for which you would be prepared to negotiate privately with the union(s) (either 
directly or through a representative), over rules to be generally applied in your plant, if 
separate agreements were negotiated covering only your plant". Finally, for the twelve 
decision areas, employers were asked to indicate those "decisions which you believe should 
be made solely by management (and therefore not subject to negotiations with the 
union(s), either over general rules or individual cases, at any level". The results for all 
three questions are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Employer willingness to negotiate decisions at national award and plant 
agreement levels (n-222) 
Work 
schedule 
Rules of 
conduct 
Job/mach 
safety 
Non-supv 
promotn 
Overtime 
assignmt 
#Emplyee 
/new job 
Task 
assignmt 
Approve 
national 
award 
negotiation 
19.8% 
45.9% 
65.3% 
0.0% 
1.4% 
5.0% 
2.3% 
Approve 
plant 
agreement 
negotiation 
36.9% 
58.1% 
63.5% 
6.3% 
17.1% 
17.1% 
5.0% 
Solely 
management 
decision 
48.6% 
39.2% 
21.6% 
87.8% 
72.1% 
69.8% 
85.6% 
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Table 3 (cont.): Employer willingness to negotiate decisions at national award and 
plant agreement levels (n=222) 
Redundnt 
emplyees 
Contract 
out work 
New mach 
/techno I 
Plant re 
loc/clos 
Redundcy 
necessry 
Approve 
national 
award 
negotiation 
12.6% 
3.2% 
0.5% 
3.2% 
1.4% 
Approve 
plant 
agreement 
negotiation 
25.7% 
7.2% 
3.6% 
5.0% 
5.0% 
Current union involvement in managerial decisions 
Solely 
management 
decision 
68.0% 
81.1% 
88.7% 
86.0% 
86.5% 
It is clear from Tables 1 and 2 that, in the firms surveyed, union input in the decision 
areas tested is not extensive. Indeed, three-quarters of the employers in the sample report 
no union involvement in any of the decision areas tested. Where union involvement is 
reported, the top end of the scale shows 25.2 percent of employers indicating that unions 
are or would be involved in the selection of employees to be made redundant. 
Interesting!~· this is a decision area where the affected employees look perhaps least kindly 
on the decision-makers. At the other end of the scale, union involvement in the selection 
of employees for promotion is reported by only 3.6 percent of employers in the sample. 
At the midpoint, union involvement is reported by more than one in 10 employers for the 
safety issue (16.7 percent), rules of conduct (14.0 percent), plant relocation or closure 
(12.3 percent), starting and finishing times (11.7 percent), contracting out of work (10.3 
percent), and the decision as to whether redundancies are necessary (10.2 percent). 
!he depth of union involvement is as limited as its breadth. Consolidating the 
Natto~~ Award, Local Agreement and Negotiation-Union decision making options, 
?egou~uon was reported by only 13.6 percent of employers on the redundancy selection 
Issue, m contrast to the 25.2 percent overall level of union involvement on that issue. 
The contrast between involvement and negotiation on the other issues was equally 
apparent 3.8 percent negotiation on safety issues versus 16.7 percent involvement, and 
6.4 percent negotiation on rules of conduct versus 14.0 percent involvement. The pattern 
continued throughout all of the issues, more pronounced on some than on others. 
The 12 decision areas can be grouped into three categories: Plant Rules 
incorporating start and finish times, rules of conduct, and safety; Assignment of Work 
and Personnel incorporating promotion, overtime assignment, determining the number 
of employees for a new job, task assignment, and the selection of redundant employees; 
and Asset Management incorporating contracting out of work, new technology, 
closure or relocation, and the decision that redundancies are necessary. Using these 
categories and simple averaging, 14.1 percent of employers reported union involvement in 
the making of plant rules, 10.9 percent reported union involvement in assignment 
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decisions, and 10.2 percent reported a role for unions in asset management decisions. 
Employer willingness to negotiate 
Employers are, in varying degrees depending on the issue involved and ~e level at 
which bargaining occurs, prepared to negotiate beyond the de~ands presently _bemg pla~ed 
upon them. This is most concisely shown in Table 4, usmg the consolidated umon 
negotiation column alongside the more encompassing union involvement column. 
Table 4: Employer willingness to negotiate decision categories at national award and 
plant agreement levels (n-222) 
Approve Approve 
Decision Current Current national plant 
category union union award agreement 
involvement negotiation negotiation negotiation 
Plant 
rules 14.1% 5.5% 43.7% 52.8% 
Work/pers 
4.3% 14.2% assignment 10.9% 4.2% 
Asset 
management 10.2% 4.3% 2.1% 5.2% 
Obviously, there is room for significant expansion of negotiations over plant rules in 
the context of either national awards or enterprise agreements. · This is true on all three of 
the plant rules tested - start and finish times, rules of conduct, _and safety - but it is most 
pronounced on the safety issue. Over 60 percent of employers m the sample are prepared 
to have safety issues negotiated at either level. At the other extreme, there appears to be 
fairly unanimous resistance on the part of employers to negotiati~n~ at any level ?~er any 
of those decisions categorized here as asset management decisions: the decisions to 
contract out work, to introduce new technology, to close or relocate the plant, and to lay 
off staff. These types of decisions are, of course, not only those that evoke most strongly 
in employers the personal motivations of which Chamberlain wrote~ they are als? those 
that impact most basically on the viability of an enterprise and, ultimately, the JOb and 
income security of its employees. Thus, it is in the middle grou~d. ~ day_ to_ day 
operational decisions over the assignment of work and personne~ - wher~ Imti~l skirm~shes 
over scope are likely to be fought, or perhaps, where collaborative relationships are likely 
to be initiated. 
Though the numbers are fairly small, employer responses in the sample indicate th~t 
there is some room to expand negotiations over the assignment of personnel, but only m 
plant level bargaining, not at the national award level. This is especially true on the 
issues of overtime assignment, determining the number of employees to work on a new 
job or machine, and selecting employees for redundancy. Promotions and task assignment 
are, for almost all employers, beyond scope at either level of bargaining. 
Work and personnel assignment decisions are traditional issues of "management 
prerogative". Although less critical to business viabilit~ than asse_t mana~ement 
decisions, they nonetheless affect efficiency, employee secunty, and the JOb ~nd mcome 
rights of employees relative to one another. There is at _least a weak stgn_al from 
employers that some of these operational issues may be negotiable at the enterpnse level 
but not under the current national award structure. 
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The broader evidence on employer willingness to negotiate at enterprise versus national 
level is somewhat mixed. On each issue other than safety, more employers expressed 
willingness to negotiate at plant level than to have the issue negotiated at national award 
level. On 5 issues, the margins were sufficient and the numbers large enough to make the 
results noteworthy. Nearly twice as many employers were prepared to negotiate work 
hours locally as were willing to have hours set by national award. Twenty six percent 
more were prepared to negotiate rules of conduct locally, although large numbers of 
employers were prepared to negotiate this issue at either level. 
About one in 6 employers were willing to negotiate rules governing overtime 
assignment at plant level; virtually none were willing to have such rules negotiated at the 
national level. Again, about one in 6 employers were prepared to negotiate locally over 
the number of employees to be assigned to a new job or machine, whereas few were 
prepared to have this matter dealt with at national level. And twice as many employers 
were prepared to negotiate rules for selection of employees to be made redundant at the 
plant level as at the national level. 
On half of the issues, while more employers were willing to negotiate locally than 
nationally, the numbers who were prepared to negotiate at either level were so small as to 
make the margins meaningless. A strong sense of management prerogative overwhelmed 
any local versus national comparison on the issues of promotion and task assignment, as 
well as on all four asset management issues. 
Finally, on the safety issue, about equal numbers - close to two out of three - were 
prepared to either negotiate at plant level or have the matter handled in national awards. 
Conclusions 
In the frrms studied, unions are not at present greatly involved in either the operational 
decisions or more basic managerial strategy decisions on which input was demanded in the 
POL's Green Paper submission. To the extent that unions are involved, that involvement 
appears, for the most part, to be at a softer level than the actual negotiation envisioned for 
the enterprise level in the NZCTU's concept of industrial democracy. 
The carrot of broader scope, associated in the official positions of employer groups 
with decentralization of the bargaining structure, finds limited support in the views of 
these employers. About half of the employers surveyed are prepared to negotiate plant 
rules at either national or local level. Virtually none are presently prepared to negotiate 
asset management decisions at either level. More, but still relatively few, are inclined to 
negotiate some operational work and personnel assignment issues at plant level than at 
national award level. 
In assessing expressed employer willingness to negotiate at enterprise level, it is 
appropriate to keep in mind that both enterprise bargaining and the negotiation at any 
level over most of these issues represent sizable departures for the average employer from 
the rather remote and one-dimensional labour relations system of their experience to date. 
Advocates of enterprise level bargaining under whatever name might conclude that the 
willingness to negotiate enterprise agreements, particularly on work and personnel 
assig~ment issues, is in ~tself encouraging, regardless of the size of the numbers. Clearly, 
there ts a need for more m-depth follow-up research into employer attitudes. To the extent 
that South Islanders are different, or perceived to be, examination of a more national 
sample may be appropriate. 
The suggestion of a link between structure and scope needs further testing. Differences 
by industry and principal union warrant examination as, in time, will the influences of 
expanded composite bargaining and union restructuring. To the extent that even a small 
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number of these relatively small employers have expressed a willingness to negotiate quite 
comprehensive local agreements, it would be of interest to know why, to know how they 
envision an enterprise bargaining system operating, and to know what they see as the role 
of the union in the enterprise. 
It is clear from the data that the concept of managerial prerogative remains alive and 
well with many New Zealand employers. Whether this. is a doctrinaire or more p~actic~l 
view, or its motivation relative to Chamberlain's findmgs or the NZCTU's urgmgs, 1s 
probably impossible to gauge from a postal survey. It is certainly an issue worth further 
research. 
While it is not the present subject of this research, it goes without saying that the 
views of union operatives, and shop floor representatives to the extent that they are in 
place, on both bargaining scope and bargaining structure, are equally important and worthy 
of empirical research. 
One interesting but rather fuzzy by-product of the research is the quite widely reported 
practice of employee consultation as suggested in ~ab.le~ 1 and 2. On almost all _of ~e 12 
decision areas tested, input from the workforce or mdtvtdual employees was more wtdely 
reported than union input. No claims are made here for that result. Employee or 
workforce 'discussion' can mean many things, and no effort was made to test the nature of 
these reported discussions. Certainly, however, given employer interest in emplo~ee 
cooperation, and union and government interest in industrial democracy, curre~t practice 
and employer attitudes in this area deserve empirical study. This is perhaps particularly so 
as it relates to the future role of unions in the enterprise under deregulated scope and a 
decentralizing bargaining structure. There may not be room in the plant for all of these 
new concepts. 
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